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“Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organization will be 
gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking 
peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and 
Empire and the United States. This is no time for generalities, and I will venture to be 
precise. Fraternal association requires not only the growing friendship and mutual 
understanding between our two vast but kindred systems of society, but the continuance 
of the intimate relationship between our military advisers, leading to common study of 
potential dangers, the similarity of weapons and manuals of instructions, and to the 
interchange of officers and cadets at technical colleges.” 
~Winston Churchill, March 5, 1946, Missouri1  
 
The “Special Relationship” between the United States and the United Kingdom dates 
back to just after World War II, when Winston Churchill first uttered the phrase.  It referred to 
the longstanding history, current policies, and probable future ties of cooperation and 
coordination between the two nations.  After the Second World War, the two nations did indeed 
enjoy a period of close friendship and trust.  However, this ‘special’ relationship was severely 
strained in 1956 by the Suez Crisis and had to undergo a period of rejuvenation to heal Anglo-
American relations during the Cold War.   
How did this repair work take place?  Who did it?  Naturally, the two political heads of 
the nations at the time– President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan 
had much to do with (re)cementing the ties between their countries and peoples.  This personal 
cooperation has been the focus of the majority of scholarly research on the subject to date.  
Prominent historians on the subject, such as E. Bruce Geelhoed and Campbell Craig, tend to 
highlight the role that the personal efforts of Eisenhower and Macmilllan played in restoring the 
‘special’ relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom. 
However, there were also many other players: Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 
Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd, Undersecretary of State Christian Herter, United States 
Ambassador to Britain John Hay Whitney, and British Ambassador to the United States Sir 
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Harold Caccia.  The contribution of these politicians, statesmen, and diplomats is often 
underestimated and/or forgotten.  Sir Harold Caccia, for example, was essential in helping to 
repair the ‘special’ relations between the United States and the United Kingdom by being an 
effective representation of the visage, proponent of the policies, and necessary government 
official of the United Kingdom. 
 
It must be first realized how important it was to revitalize the ‘Special Relationship’ 
between the United States and the United Kingdom.  The 1950’s were not optimal years to have 
a falling-out between allies; in the face of the threat of Communism, it was important to maintain 
unity on the free side of the Iron Curtain.  This unity was vital, as Churchill even said in 1946, to 
prevent war.  The 1956 Suez Crisis threatened to divide two of the most powerful Western allies, 
therefore threatening the entire free alliance. 
In July of 1956, the United States decided to withdraw its offer to provide monetary 
assistance in the construction of the Aswan Dam in Egypt – a move that shocked the 
Government of the United Kingdom, which took offense that they “were informed, not 
consulted.”2  President Nasser then announced only a few days later – on July 29, 1956 – that he 
had nationalized the Suez Canal to be in the sole control of Egypt and intended to use the profits 
to pay for the Aswan Dam.  The United Kingdom, therefore, somewhat blamed Nasser’s 
nationalization of the Suez Canal on the United States, and was saddened by the fact that 
Eisenhower and the U.S., in their support of Nasser’s action, seemed to be disregarding the 
“rights” and “interests” of the U.K. – their long time ally.3  President Nasser’s nationalization of 
the Suez Canal also “seemed to confirm beyond all doubt that the United Kingdom was no 
                                                          
     
2
 Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm: 1956-1959 (London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1971), 99.  
     
3
 Ibid., 103-104.   
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longer a world power,” and also put their long-term oil supply in grave danger.4  All of Europe – 
especially Great Britain – was enormously dependant on the oil that was shipped through the 
canal, thus the nationalization of the Suez Canal prompted fears that there would be a severe oil 
and energy shortage. 
The United States, in turn, was appalled at the British declaration to use force to reclaim 
the canal – Eisenhower himself stated: “I think that Britain and France have made a terrible 
mistake.”5  After the Egyptian nationalization of the canal, the U.K. and France openly 
proclaimed their interest in reclaiming their old status quo in the region, even if it meant the use 
of force.  The two European nations found a natural ally against Egypt in Israel, and started 
covert meetings between leaders of the three nations in Paris.  This deception would be a main 
reason for negative opinion towards the U.K. in the U.S.; the United States was shocked to learn 
that they had been ‘double-crossed’ and deceived by such a close friend.6  Eisenhower and the 
Government of the United States were again troubled when Israel invaded Egypt in October – 
the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 stated that the United States, Great Britain, and France would 
help a Middle Eastern victim of aggression.  However, in this instance, Great Britain and France 
were so likely to join Israel in military action (due to their dependence on oil shipped through the 
Suez Canal) that it placed the U.S. between a rock and a hard place.  Eisenhower did not want to 
neither go back on his word in the Tripartite Declaration nor fight against their ‘special’ ally – 
especially when considering the context of the Cold War.7 
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Further military action by the United Kingdom elicited more negative opinion by the 
United States.  When the United States found evidence (through their U-2 spy planes) that the 
U.K. had begun bombing of strategic locations in Egypt, the U.S. denounced this action as a 
form of colonialism.8  Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and the Government of 
the United States were even more incensed when British land troops invaded Egypt on 
November 5, 1956.  The U.S. not only felt that this action had depreciated the power of the 
United States and demonstrated the duplicity of the Government of the United Kingdom, but had 
also hurt the overall Middle Eastern and global Cold War goals.  And, perhaps most central to all 
of these factors, the United States felt – and feared – that the ‘specialness’ of their relationship 
with the United Kingdom was seriously damaged.9\ 
In terms of the Cold War, the Eisenhower Administration was also very concerned about 
the possibility of Soviet intervention in the Suez situation.  Indeed, after British landings in 
Egypt, Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin proposed to Eisenhower that their two nations join 
forces to restore peace to the Middle East.  Bulganin also warned that the Suez Crisis could very 
well escalate into a third World War.10  This unnatural (proposed) alliance in the midst of the 
tense Cold War demonstrates the powerful impact the negative feeling between the United States 
and the United Kingdom (as well as France and Israel – though neither of these nations had the 
previously ‘special’ relationship with the United States that therefore intensified its reaction 
against the U.K.) had on the strength Free Alliance during this time.  Eisenhower also took 
Bulganin’s message to be a warning of imminent Soviet military action in the Suez region, and 
so thus issued a statement that only United Nations forces could enter the Middle East: there 
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should be no unilateral intervention.11  This was again a direct condemnation of British action, 
which further angered the Brits that the United States seemed to leading the opposition against 
them.12 
The Government of the United Kingdom was taken aback that their ‘special’ ally had not 
supported them – many, including the future Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, believed that the 
U.S. condemnation was only a formality; that in reality “the majority of the American people in 
every walk of life felt a deep sympathy for the French and British […].”  However, Macmillan 
and the rest of the government soon realized that “these were vain consolations.”13  Public 
opinion in the United States was not favorable towards the United Kingdom: the American 
people felt that they had been “betray[ed]” and “insult[ed].”14  John Foster Dulles openly 
criticized and insulted the British for their recent actions in the Middle East and their demanding 
nature to have the United States support whatever they did: “And if we don’t give the British a 
blank check on the United States for whatever their policies are in the Middle East, then the 
British get upset and they try to put pressures into doing it.”15  Dulles also condemned British 
action for inherently assisting their enemy – the Soviet Union.16 
In the United Kingdom, too, emotions ran high.  Macmillan remembered that talk about 
the Suez Crisis went beyond the Houses of Parliament and the offices of the Government into the 
casual locations of the average British citizen.17  The British felt as if the United States did not 
understand the needs and desires of the U.K., and took out their frustration against any 
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Americans in the country.18  Signs were even posted that said “No Americans Served Here;” 
Anti-Americanism in the U.K. was a real problem.19 
Despite the heated attacks, the leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom 
never wanted the alliance between the two nations to end.  Perhaps because of the closeness of 
their relationship, the value that each placed upon it, and the “passionate nature of the crisis,” the 
U.S. and the U.K. realized that their ‘special’ relationship should not – could not – be left to 
weaken or die.20  It was during this time that Sir Harold Caccia took up his post as Ambassador 
to the United States. 
 
Sir Harold Caccia was educated at Eton College and Trinity College, Oxford.  He began 
his diplomatic experience in service to China and Greece, and then became a secretary to Prime 
Minister Anthony Eden.21  During World War II, he worked in North Africa with the Supreme 
Commander of Allied Forces: General Dwight D. Eisenhower.22  Continuing his work in the 
Foreign Office, Caccia served as Ambassador to Austria from 1951 – 1954, after which he 
became the deputy Under-Secretary of State.23  Harold Caccia had a wife and two young 
daughters; Teresa and Antonia (the younger, age nine in 1956), who traveled with him.24 
Caccia was appointed to be the British Ambassador to the United States in July of 1956, 
arriving in America and beginning his duties in November of the same year.  Caccia was a part 
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of the new “cast of characters” involved in U.S. – U.K. relations: Prime Minister Anthony Eden 
would be replaced by Harold Macmillan, U.S. Ambassador to London Winthrop Aldrich would 
be replaced by John Hay Whitney, and Harold Caccia took over for Sir Roger Makins when the 
latter was appointed Secretary and Head of Treasury by Harold Macmillan (when he was still 
Chancellor of the Exchequer).  All of these personnel changes occurred by December of 1956.  It 
was believed that “these new men […] all face the same immense problem: reestablishing a trust 
which had come to be accepted as axiomatic in international circles and has now disintegrated 
with a totality both disturbing and astonishing.  The change in cast of characters many facilitate 
restoration of a friendship that is deeply rooted and so much in [both U.S. and U.K.] interest.”25  
The fresh faces would prove to be useful because they were not tainted by the scandal and 
negativity of the Suez Crisis and also represented a new life to the ‘special’ relationship. 
This aspect of the timing and symbolism of Caccia’s appointment are essential to keep in 
mind when considering the modern Ambassador’s role as a public relations representative for 
his/her home nation.  Ambassador Caccia’s many speeches and endearing acts were a publicity 
front for the United Kingdom.  As the formal representative of Britain, his words and actions that 
encouraged cooperation between the U.S. and the U.K. helped to form a more positive public 
opinion of the United Kingdom, and therefore a more positive opinion about the heightened 
collaboration between the two nations.   
Entering into his office as ambassador, Caccia outlined his belief that the United States 
and Britain “cannot afford to stand without each other […] to quarrel or do things that arouse the 
criticism or mistrust of each other.”26  He firmly believed that “there had never been a time when 
                                                          
     
25
 C.L. Sulzberger, “Foreign Affairs: Rebuilding an Old Alliance with New Men,” New York Times, November 
28, 1956.  
     
26
  Correspondent, “New British Envoy Asks for Close Ties with U.S.,” New York Times, November 8, 1956. 
9 
 
it was more important to strengthen the British-American alliance.”27  Perhaps even more 
effective than simply promoting close relations, was showing a correlation between the 
importance of a stronger alliance and the success and vitality of the United States.  In one 
address, Caccia stated that tensions between the U.S. and the U.K. “manifestly [had] not 
prevented the Russians from forging ahead;” in other words, poor U.S. – U.K. relations were 
helping the Soviets.28  By connecting the alliance with success in waging the Cold War, Caccia 
would have made the healing and rejuvenation process seem more necessary and therefore 
favorable to any American.  Caccia also said Britain complemented the U.S. in its steadfastness 
against communism, adding that to continue such strength, the U.S. would have to have closer 
ties to Britain, as “world prosperity was indivisible,” hence the two nations needed to share 
resources and information.29  Caccia did not simply state that close collaboration was important, 
but said that it was the next logical step for the United States in its heroic fight against 
communism.  He hoped that this argument would be attractive to the American mindset.  
Appealing to the Eisenhower Administration’s policy of collective security, Caccia also 
explained that “the power, not only of Britain, but also of the United States, is sustained in 
proportion to the closeness of relations between our two countries.  Whatever strengthens your 
ally [the United Kingdom], strengthens the Unites States; whatever weakens your ally, weakens 
the United States.”30  This statement puts the ‘special relationship’ in terms of containment, 
mutual defense, collective security, and, as Eisenhower put it, the very survival of the American 
way of life.  
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This connection would certainly put close relations with the United Kingdom in a very 
positive light.  Caccia traveled throughout the United States giving speeches and presentations 
which all promoted this close collaboration between the United States and the United Kingdom.  
This high profile of the Ambassador, his beliefs, and his nation’s goals for and policies on closer 
collaboration therefore reached the general American public.  The extensive spreading of these 
ideas helped to form a more positive U.S. attitude toward Britain and infuse the importance of a 
close alliance in the American people. 
Caccia further heightened his public profile through his attendance and participation in 
popular and cultural events, such as the centenary celebrations of the Peabody Institute of Johns 
Hopkins University.31  The Ambassador was not a mere observer at this event, but issued a 
speech at the closing ceremonies on the topic of “Britain and the Future.”  Britain’s ambassador 
to the U.S. used even a so seemingly unrelated event as a celebration of a music conservatory to 
announce and highlight Britain’s achievements and policies.   
The most notable and positive press that the United Kingdom received was during the 
official state visit of Queen Elizabeth II in October of 1957.  Ambassador Caccia, as the 
permanent representation of the Queen’s nation in the U.S., was highly involved in the many 
activities and ceremonies, and thus added to the amazing spectacle and outcome of the visit.  
Caccia received greeted the Queen with his wife and children (one of his daughters was even 
selected to perform in the pageant for the monarch’s honor) when the Queen arrived.32  He also 
continued to be with her throughout her visit, and was a co-participator in the founding 
anniversary commemorations of the Jamestown settlement.33  The people of the United States 
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were in awe of the monarch and her court; the President remembered that “enthusiastic crowds, 
standing in a drizzling rain, lined the streets to meet them.”34   
Eisenhower himself recognized the value and importance of Queen Elizabeth’s state visit; 
it had a huge positive impact on the public of the United States, making the United Kingdom 
seem more appealing as a nation.35  As the monarch of the U.K. was only an official figurehead 
and symbol of the nation, the Queen’s visit could only have an effect on personal opinion, and so 
any recognized effect that the visit had on the friendship and relations between the U.S. and the 
U.K. was only made through this personal appeal and draw.36   
 Shaping public opinion was firmly on the agenda of the Eisenhower Administration. The 
joint effort in this arena inherently added to the amount of advertisement of strong relations, 
therefore greatly affecting the public.  The President recognized how the Queen’s visit aided in 
the collaboration between the U.S. and the U.K. and therefore the “security and peace of the 
world.”37  Dulles also publically announced that that the visits from the Queen and the Prime 
Minister did much to “tie together not just the United States and the Commonwealth Nations, but 
all free nations.”38  The deliberate promotion of close ties between the U.S. and the U.K. by the 
Eisenhower Administration shows their own efforts to make such ties more appealing to the 
national audience. 
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The Eisenhower Administration also recognized the effect the British Embassy had in 
America during the time of rebuilding relations between the U.S. and the U.K.39  Correcting 
public opinion in both countries to a more positive mindset was a goal of the U.S. government.  
As aforementioned, at the time of and after the Suez Crisis, public sentiment was quite negative 
toward the other nation, a factor that would have prevented any real trusting relationship between 
the two countries.  Two nations do not stand a chance of having close and positive relations 
when one has signs banning citizens from the other, or when one leads world opposition to the 
other.  Caccia, his Government, and the Eisenhower Administration took direct measures to 
change poor public opinions and form a more favorable outlook in each nation toward the other.  
These efforts, by the close relationship that resulted between these officials and their nations, 
prove that their efforts were successful.  Only by having total confidence in one another could an 
effective and trusting relationship be built. 
 
Simultaneously to establishing a positive visage for Great Britain as a nation, 
Ambassador Caccia also worked to create a positive U.S. opinion of British policies.  The United 
Kingdom made a conscious effort to connect to the United States’ achievements, strengths, 
values, and goals.  Caccia, as he was in the U.S., was in a prime position to promote the inherent 
connection between the U.K. and the U.S., a feature that gave clear and obvious logic as to why 
the United States and the United Kingdom should be so close.  All of this work was essential to 
producing effective cooperation between the two nations. 
Ambassador Caccia was not an appointment by favor, but of merit.  His previous work 
for the Government of the United Kingdom, under Eisenhower, and in foreign diplomacy proves 
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that Caccia was a knowledgeable government official.  Caccia’s activism in his post and his 
recognition in the “absolute necessity’ of United-British cooperation,’ from his very first day on 
the job points to the fact that the Ambassador was knowledgeable about his nation, what was at 
stake, and what needed to be completed to restore the ‘special’ relationship.40 
For example, often the nuclear power of the United Kingdom was overlooked – Caccia 
worked to make sure that this was not the case.  In October of 1957, prior to the Soviet launch of 
Sputnik, Britain opened the Calder Hall Nuclear Reactor site; a development more advanced than 
American reactors to date.41  In addition, Great Britain had also successfully tested their first 
thermonuclear weapon on May 15, 1957.42  Despite these awesome achievements, the U.K. still 
was behind the U.S. in some areas in scientific development, and therefore, why Macmillan’s 
Government pushed so strongly for an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act.  However, it was 
also emphasized by British Government officials that that the U.K. had knowledge to share; the 
exchange of information would also benefit the United States.43  This was done under the advice 
of Ambassador Caccia, who saw that “American acceptance of Britain as a great power, and the 
possibility of exercising influence on U.S. policy, rested on having a military nuclear programme 
with ‘megaton as well as kiloton weapons.’”44  By guiding the policy of the United Kingdom on 
this issue and by promoting U.K. strengths to the United States, Caccia raised Britain to the 
intellectual and innovative level of America, showing that a close alliance was indeed feasible 
and logical. 
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Caccia often promoted the strengths of the United Kingdom to make the U.K. seem a 
more natural ally to the United States.  The U.K. was actively contributing, Caccia stated, to 
collective security against Communism and recruitment for the free world by providing scientific 
knowledge, technicians, and economic support to under-developed nations.45  The Ambassador 
even hinted at the fact that the U.K. was doing a better job than the U.S. at supporting other 
nations economically, an important tool in drawing developing countries into the Western 
alliance.  Combating neutralism and recruiting new free world nations was an important strategy 
to withstanding the pressures of the Iron Curtain, and therefore an important (joint) foreign 
policy of the U.K. and the U.S.  
Caccia also proved that the United Kingdom was an obvious and positive ally for the 
United States by showing that his country had the same values and beliefs as the U.S.  He 
pointed out that the U.K. was able to listen to, take advice from, and adjust to firm demands of 
the Eisenhower Administration in relation to action in the Middle East.46  This demonstrated to 
the U.S. that the U.K. was interested in making sacrifices to be able to keep and strengthen the 
alliance; it showed the importance and value the U.K. gave to cooperation and collaboration with 
the U.S.  In addition, Caccia related the United Kingdom to the Unites States by highlighting the 
constant progress of each nation.  Caccia fought to combat a common (mis-) perception of the 
time that the U.K. was ‘backward;’ he spoke of the “innovation in industry, expansion in trade, 
realism in defense, and progress in Commonwealth and international affairs.”47  These features 
of the United Kingdom were also focuses of the United States; the common ground once again 
legitimized the need for strong, positive relations between the two countries.  Caccia also 
characterized the British people themselves as strong, hard-working, and creative; traits that were 
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also commonly connected to the United States at the time.  By showing how the two counties 
were so similar in values, Caccia was able to support, encourage, and contribute to the repair of 
U.S. – U.K. relations. 
A point of dissent between the British and American peoples was the issue of colonialism 
and imperialism.  This issue was especially applicable in light of British military action in Egypt 
during the Suez Crisis.  The American point of view officially stated that policies of colonialism 
were over-bearing and did not allow for true democracy – an important and essential issue when 
combating Soviet domination over its satellites.  As the United Kingdom had a history of 
colonialism and its foreign relations (such as with Egypt) during the Cold War were still 
influenced by that past, this was a point of contention between the two allies.  Caccia, in a speech 
to the American people in Chicago, stated that British expansion (and its resulting interests) was 
merely an equivalent to American expansion: “Some people seem to think that expansion 
beyond the seas is in some ways more imperialistic, reprehensible, and reactionary than 
expansion over land.  We do not expect you to be ashamed of your expansion over land as I am 
sure you do not expect us to be ashamed of our expansion overseas.’”48  This was truly an 
important and strategic point to make, as the U.K. in part based its action regarding the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal on its past domination of and current interests in Egypt.  The 
Suez Crisis was the trip-wire for the deterioration of U.S. – U.K. relations; legitimizing British 
expansionism was therefore in a way excusing their actions in the Suez Crisis as well as relating 
their actions to those of the United States.  Any qualms over increased collaboration with the 
‘imperialistic’ United Kingdom would have been at least partly assuaged by this connection. 
Caccia also connected British goals to those of the United States and the Eisenhower 
Administration – those of having close cooperation while maintaining interdependence.  This 
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common belief is another reason why the relationship between the U.S. and the U.K. was able to 
be mended.  A theme of Prime Minister Macmillan’s Foreign Policy – especially in regards to 
the United States – was interdependence.  This view held that the United States and the United 
Kingdom should have common broad policies, but would be allowed to differ in the finer and 
more specific points of policy, as long these differences did not lead to disagreements or 
disunity.  For example, Macmillian and Eisenhower disagreed with each other about the 
administrative aspects of the amendment to the Atomic Energy Act and about disarmament.49     
The crux of the matter was that neither nation was subordinate to the other – this was one 
point about which Caccia was firm and which he intensely promoted.  The Ambassador ensured 
that the United States knew that any action on the part of the United Kingdom would be as “an 
independent nation, not as the tail to the American kite.”50  In addition, during the aftermath of 
the Suez Crisis, Caccia held firm on what Britain needed and demanded.  He warned the United 
States that they should not let the Middle East situation “drift back to the status quo,’” for it is 
only a “’link in the chain of security involving the safety of the United States as well as Great 
Britain.’”51  This was a savvy political move on Caccia’s part; by connecting the Middle East 
situation to the defense and security of the United States, Caccia was much more likely to get a 
positive reaction to his appeal, while at the same time promoting the strength of his nation and 
not backing down to the United States. 
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Despite differences in opinion and policy, Caccia also recognized that it was vitally 
important to maintain and continually strengthen ties within the free world.  This is the key to 
interdependence; that nations are allowed to firmly promote their own positions while still 
positively contributing to the alliance, strength, and unity of the free nations.  Ambassador 
Caccia was a strong advocate for interdependence; he believed that the prosperity, stability, and 
survival of human society rested in the ability to “reconcile the national texture of political 
government with the international scale of the pattern of interdependence.”52   
President Eisenhower had similar beliefs.  As evidenced by the personal correspondence 
and exchange of ideas between Macmillan and Eisenhower, the President had no qualms about 
he and the Prime Minister disagreeing with one another; he believed that such a thing would 
simply be inherent and unavoidable due to the fact that they were from two different nations, 
each with its own unique pressures from politics, society, economics, etc.  Eisenhower also 
firmly encouraged interdependence, as proven by his work in the “Declaration of Common 
Purpose” (a joint proclamation by Eisenhower and Macmillan from the Washington Talks of 
October 1957) and his actions at the many conferences with British officials.53  Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles also often stated the need for cooperation with allies and for the need for the 
U.S. to aim for a feeling of trust and a policy of “common defense” with the U.K. as is described 
in the Constitution.54 
Having similar, if not common, policies between the United States and the United 
Kingdom was essential to the restoration of their ‘special’ relationship.  This common ground, 
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which was deliberately promoted and encouraged by their representatives and officials, helped 
the relationship between the two countries seem more practical and natural.  This sentiment 
would hence lead to the feeling that the partnership was an obvious one; that relations between 
the U.S. and the U.K. should, therefore, be continued and improved. 
 
These policies, of course, had to be implemented in some way for the ‘special’ 
relationship to be truly formal and effective.  Fortunately, Ambassador Caccia was no stranger to 
the task of diplomacy and politics.  Immediately prior to his appointment to the ambassadorship, 
Caccia served as the Deputy Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office and had attended 
many international and alliance meetings in assistance to Lloyd and then-Prime Minister 
Anthony Eden.55  The new ambassador had also previously worked with President Eisenhower 
during the latter’s command of North Africa during the Second World War.56  This experience 
during the World War II familiarized Caccia with the system of having joint talks and plans; an 
idea that Macmillan would idealize upon becoming Prime Minister.  As the Prime Minister said 
to Eisenhower, one of his aims was to “return to that close integration of our efforts which 
brought us such striking success during the war.”57  One way to have close integration was an 
increased level of personal contact and conversation between officials of each country; this was 
done in both formal and informal atmospheres.   
One of the first meetings Caccia had with John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, was an 
unplanned discussion on January 27, 1957 along with Mr. Duncan Sandys, the British Minister 
of Defense.  These talks were open and frank, and were the first between ministers of the two 
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nations since the Suez Crisis.  Discussed subjects included the Middle East, defense budget, and 
overall cooperation.58  Following that discussion, Caccia met with other members of the State 
Department to talk about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Atlantic 
alliance.59  These conversations were vital for they were the first time that such important topics 
were discussed jointly between representatives of the U.S. and the U.K.  Caccia also met with 
representatives of the State Department for a variety of other important matters, such as 
disarmament,60 the Berlin Crisis,61 and forces in Korea.62  In all of these meetings, Caccia was 
not just an observer, but an active participant, voicing ideas and opinions.  His essential role in 
meetings (on a wide variety of topics) is shown by the fact that he was called back to 
Washington from a trip to Colorado six days ahead of schedule for discussions about Syria and 
its possible shift to communism.63  The fact that Caccia was urgently called back for these 
meetings is evidence of that his presence was needed and that he was not a mere figurehead or 
symbol of the United Kingdom in the States.    
Important discussions were also held in more informal settings, often at lunches, dinners, 
and dances.  Caccia was often an attendee at such small events with Dulles and Eisenhower.  
Examples of these events are a dinner with Dulles at the British Embassy on February 29, 
1957,64 and a dinner with at the Dulles residence with the Caccias and the Prime Minister.65  
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Meal-time discussions also often took place throughout the many conferences between the Prime 
Minister and the President.  Throughout the Bermuda Conference, the Washington Talks, and the 
Camp David Summit, Caccia was consistently included in discussions over lunch or dinner.66  
Topics discussed at these lunches included the alliance system, relations with the Middle East, 
sharing of information, German re-unification, and developments of the Soviet Union.  These 
were essential topics of the time, and Caccia was included in the select group of people that were 
attended the more personal, informal discussions.67   
Caccia was also a frequent caller at the Dulles resident spoke even more frequently on the 
phone with the Secretary of State.  Dulles and Caccia spoke personally whenever the ‘special’ 
relationship or the Free World alliance was concerned.  In addition, they had many confidential 
conversations; in reference to the topic of one conversation, the only note is: “Secretary and 
Caccia agreed to hold it close.”68  They also spoke frequently about the Middle Eastern and 
Asian nations; their numerous conversations on these subjects are not yet de-classified. 
Ambassador Caccia was also an important member of the more formal nature of these 
many meetings between officials of the Unites States and the United Kingdom.  There were three 
momentous meetings between Eisenhower and Macmillan: the Bermuda Talks of March 1956, 
the Washington Talks of October 1957, and the Camp David Summit of September 1959.   
During the actual meetings the President and the Prime Minister naturally dominated; however, 
Caccia was instrumental in the enormous amount of preparation work for each of the 
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conferences.  Eisenhower and Macmillan planned to have their Embassies start working on 
various topics of discussion prior to the Bermuda Conference of March of 1957.69  Caccia and 
the Department of State discussed the role of the United Nations, policy towards USSR satellites, 
keeping Africa ‘free,’ possible resolutions for the conflict in Palestine, oil, disarmament, German 
reunification, the European free trade area, and the Suez Crisis in depth prior to the Bermuda 
Conference.70  These talks produced formal papers of agreed joint decisions; notable decisions 
were on “Means of Combating Communist Influence in Tropical Africa,”71 “The Prospect of a 
Palestine Settlement,”72 and “Guarantees for Maintenance of Flow of Middle East Oil through 
Pipelines.”73   
Caccia’s presentations of the views and policies of the U.K. also allowed the U.S. to 
anticipate what stance Macmillan would take at the Conference, what the U.S. response should 
be, and what decisions and/or solutions were likely to be reached.  For example, Caccia firmly 
promoted the U.K. interests in the Middle East, and that they were only interested in close 
cooperation in that region as an independent nation, not following the lead and decisions of the 
United States.74  Notice in advance of this firm opinion would allow the formal talks at Bermuda 
to go much more smoothly and without drama.  The United States was also able to better 
understand Selwyn Lloyd’s – the U.K. Minister of Defense – ‘Grand Design’ prior to the 
conference because of Caccia’s presentation and explanation.  This enabled the U.S. to be better 
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prepared and able to respond when this topic was introduced at the Bermuda Conference.75  Had 
it not been for Caccia’s work with the Department of State prior to the conference, the American 
delegation could have been quite shocked at Lloyd’s ‘Grand Design’, which included plans to 
create a formal pan-European parliamentary body as a subset of NATO.76  Caccia was also a 
British representative to the Canada – U.S. – U.K. meeting to discuss unity and survival in the 
Cold War.77  The Ambassador did a vast amount of work to prepare for all of these meetings that 
would serve to rebuild the ‘special relationship.’ 
Among Caccia’s duties was also the creation and signing of government documents as 
well as the creation of bilateral working groups to increase cooperation between the two nations.  
Ambassador Caccia was very involved in the nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and the U.K.  
He helped create a draft plan for allowing the Royal Air Force to carry U.S. weapons,78 to “set 
up joint naval research stations in the Bahamas to obtain ocean data useful in meeting any 
submarine threat,”79 and the establishment of joint missile bases in Britain.80  These 
achievements were effective ways to utilize, and resounding symbols of, the renewed 
cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom.   
Another important feature of this cooperation was the joint working groups, which were 
secretly institutionalized after the Washington Talks in October of 1957.  The working groups, 
based in the States, were overseen by Ambassador Caccia, as the head of the British delegation 
in the U.S.  Caccia was enthused about the possible products and pay-offs of these working 
groups; they were a way for the British to “glean greater knowledge about the substance of 
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American policy, to interject British views, and even to influence the formation of American 
policy itself.”81  Working groups consisted of about two people from each nation who routinely 
discussed problems which affected the free world and devised possible joint solutions.82  Caccia 
was instrumental in the formation of these groups, selecting representatives, and guiding the 
discussions. 
Ambassador Caccia also had to frequently promote his nation’s policies and goals to the 
leaders of the United States.  He was not an Ambassador who was willing to follow every U.S. 
decision, but was a strong proponent of his own country.  For example, when the United States 
did not accept the bid from English Electric, Caccia personally “protested to the State 
Department against the decision and wondered about how “foreign firms are allowed to put in 
for a tender, and then, when they put in the lowest bid, they are told that, after all, questions of 
national security debar them from being awarded the contract.’”83  Caccia was incensed that their 
bid was rejected after intensive negotiations to improve U.S. – U.K. relations and to harmonize 
their economic policies.  He strongly objected to what had happened and it resulted in 
Eisenhower initiating a change to the Buy American Act.  The Ambassador also represented his 
nation’s economic needs by explaining and pressing for satisfaction of Britain’s economic 
demands.84  An appeal by Caccia to meet the oil needs of Britain and Europe prompted the 
United States Government to encourage American oil companies to assist their allies.85   
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Clearly, Caccia’s collaboration with his peers in the U.S. was effective.  Macmillan noted 
to Eisenhower on April 15, 1957 “how grateful we all are for the really close consultation and 
co-operation which has been re-established between Foster and his people and Harold Caccia 
and our Foreign Office.  This has worked very well during these anxious days.”86  Evidence in 
the papers of John Foster Dulles also shows that Caccia had a good working relationship with 
Eisenhower Administration.87 
A reason for Caccia’s effectiveness during his tenure as Ambassador to the United States 
was that his own beliefs and actions in regards to implementation of policies corresponded with 
Eisenhower’s.  Eisenhower was not a believer of regular summit meetings between the top 
leaders of nations – he preferred to discuss and decide things in more informal, personal 
situations.88  He did not believe that frequent formal gatherings would be efficient or productive, 
but preferred to work through the channels of connection and communication – such as the 
Ambassadors.  President Eisenhower was also firmly dedicated to repairing U.S. – U.K. relations 
after the Suez Crisis; he believed that unity between his country and the United Kingdom was 
vital to the wider unity and strength of the NATO nations.89  He and Dulles were also supporters 
of interdependence, believing that it was the foundation for true friendship – a belief which 
Caccia also held.90  
Caccia and Eisenhower were also co-workers and proponents of the “Declaration of a 
Common Purpose” and the amendment to the Atomic Energy Act.  These two documents were 
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effective ways of both formally stating the (renewed) ties between the U.S and the U.K. and 
acting upon such ties.  The “Declaration of a Common Purpose” was the product of the 
Washington Talks, when Macmillan came to Washington, D.C. after the Soviet Union launched 
the satellite Sputnik.  The document proclaimed that the two nations were dedicated to common 
values and collective decisions and actions.  It listed nine bilateral goals: to encourage 
interdependence by sharing resources and responsibilities in order to increase safety of the free 
world, to increase scientific research, to adjust the United States’ Atomic Energy Act to further 
teamwork, to build up stocks of nuclear weapons, to commit to collective security, to retain close 
relationships with other allies, to contribute to a “bulwark” against communism, to harmonize 
economic action, and to have similar moral goals.  The fulfillment of these aims would lead to 
greater unity, strength, safety, and the eventual defeat of Communism.91 
The amendment to the Atomic Energy Act was passed and signed into law on July 2, 
1958.92  This was an outstanding achievement and highlight of how U.S. – U.K. relations had 
improved in a little less than two years.  The British had long hoped for a closer scientific and 
nuclear collaboration with the United States, and Eisenhower had long hoped for a more relaxed 
policy dictating what was able to be shared.  Caccia was the one who, after the launch of 
Sputnik, alerted his home Government that the “time was ripe” for a renewed effort for an 
Atomic Energy Act amendment.93  Eisenhower and his Administration worked hard to have the 
Congress pass the amendment; the President impressed upon Congress how important it was that 
they “enact the necessary legislation to enable [the U.S.] to exchange appropriate scientific and 
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technical information with friendly countries as part of our effort to achieve effective scientific 
cooperation.”94   
Ambassador Harold Caccia played a part in the creation of these documents, and the 
formation of many other bilateral decisions and resolutions that were also outlined.  The fact that 
Caccia was working toward the same beliefs, goals, and actions as Eisenhower allowed for 
Caccia’s service to be effective, and the healing of U.S. – U.K. relations go smoothly and take 
place relatively quickly.   
 
Ambassador Harold Caccia had many versatile roles and duties that all were aimed at 
rebuilding relations between the United States and the United Kingdom.  Caccia conducted 
effective and important legwork as a state official, related U.K. policies to those of the U.S., and 
helped make the public feeling about the U.K. – and therefore any collaboration with the U.K. – 
more positive and attractive.  All of these duties helped to reconstruct the “Special Relationship,” 
which Caccia viewed as an “absolute necessity.’”95  Caccia’s actions were made all the more 
effective because of his shared beliefs and goals with the Eisenhower Administration – without 
this primary collaboration, a closer partnership between the U.S. and the U.K. would have been 
impossible. 
Perhaps because of these shared values and goals, Ambassador Caccia’s role in the 
reconstruction of relations is often forgotten and ignored, though they were highly valued at the 
time.96  Certainly, there were many other important players in this movement: John Foster 
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Dulles, Selwyn Lloyd, and certainly not the least, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower.  The widely publicized correspondence, conversations, joint 
documents, and personal relationship between these two leaders dominated the scene and still 
continue to be the most often cited cause of the rebuilding of U.S. – U.K. relations.  The 
President and Prime Minister certainly did much to bring their nations closer together in a 
dangerous time.  It is important, however, to remember the role that others also played.  One 
resident to London in 1958 so firmly foresaw this enough to submit a “Letter to the Editor:” 
“It is possibly true that ambassadors of the past were men of greater statue than 
the ambassadors of to-day; certainly they were more colourful in their dress and 
in their idiosyncrasies.  But the creation of foreign policy was as much the 
prerogative of government in the past as it is to-day, and the function of 
ambassadors remains what it has always been: to project that foreign policy and to 
mirror faithfully and accurately the reactions of the countries to which they are 
accredited.  Owing to the rapidity with which one event succeeds another and to 
the speed of communications, it is much harder work being an ambassador to-day 
that is was, say, a century ago, and no such fun.  But I wonder whether the 
ambassadors of a more picturesque age had the versatility to do what would be 
required of them to-day.  Abolish ambassadors?  Nonsense.”97 
 
History should not ignore – and therefore negate – the important role that other, less prominent, 
figures played in rebuilding the “Special Relationship.”  Ambassador Harold Caccia clearly was 
one such person who played an essential role in the great endeavor of increasing cooperation and 
collaboration, and deserves to have his actions and achievement recognized. 
It is important to remember that it was not merely Eisenhower and Macmillan, and not 
only the nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and the U.K. that resulted in the renewed “Special 
Relationship.”  Contributing factors also included the many meetings, conversations, 
conferences, documents, achievements, common values and goals, and public relations work – 
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all in which Ambassador Harold Caccia had a part to play.  Only by appreciating this enormous 
amount and wide variety of work, can one truly appreciate and understand the monumental and 
vital task of rebuilding the “Special Relationship.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
Primary Sources:  
 
Caccia, Harold.  “The British Ambassador Addressed American Newcomen at New York.”  The 
Newcomen Society in North America.  New York: The Newcomen Society, 1958. 
  
Caccia, Harold. “Under-Developed Countries and Population Trends: The Challenge of our 
Times,” Vital Speeches of the Day 26, no. 3 (November 15, 1959): 87-89. 
 
Churchill, Winston. “The Sinews of Peace, Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, March 5, 
1946.”  NATO On-Line Library.  November 21, 2001. http://www.nato.int/docu/ 
speech/1946/s460305a_e.htm.  (accessed April 2, 2012). 
 
Department of State. Declaration of Washington: A Joint Decision of the President of the United 
States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.  Washington: Department of State 
Publications, February 1, 1956.  Library of Congress. 
 
Dulles, John Foster Collections.  Papers, 1860 – 1988.  Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton 
University.  Princeton, NJ. 
 
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Waging Peace 1956 – 1961. Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 
1965. 
 
Galambos, Louis, and Duan Van Ee. The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The Presidency, 
Keeping the Peace.  Vol. XVIII.  Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. 
 
Geelhoed, E. Bruce, and Anthony O. Edmonds, ed. The Macmillan – Eisenhower 
Correspondence, 1957 – 1969. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
 
Glennon, John P., ed.  Western Europe and Canada.  Vol. 47 of Foreign Relations of the United\
 States 1955-1957 (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1992). 
 
LaFantasie, Glenn W., ed.  Western Europe.  Vol. 7 of Foreign Relations of the United States 
1958-1960 (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1993). 
 
Lester, Robert E., ed. Documents of the National Security Council.   Sup. 9.  Bethesda, 
LexisNexis of University Publications of America, 2006.  Microfilm. 
 
Lester, Robert E., ed. Minutes of Telephone Conversations of John Foster Dulles and of 
Christian Herter. Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America, 1980. 
Microfilm. 
 
Lester, Robert E., ed. Presidential Trips and Conferences, part 2 of The Confidential File of the 
Eisenhower White House, 1953-1961.  Bethesda: LexisNexis of University Publications 
30 
 
of America, 2005.  Microfilm. 
 
The London Times, 1956 – 1959. 
 
Macmillan, Harold. Riding the Storm: 1956-1959. London: Harper and Row Publishers, 1971. 
 
The Manchester Guardian, 1956 – 1958. 
 
New York Times, 1956 – 1958. 
 
U.S. Congress. House. Proposed Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland for the Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual 
Defense Purposes. 85th Cong., 2nd sess., 1958. H. Doc. 2299. 
 
 
 
Secondary Sources: 
 
Balogh, Brian. Chain Reaction: Expert Debate and Public Participation in American 
Commercial Nuclear Power, 1945-1975. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
 
Baylis, John. “The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defense Agreement: The Search for Nuclear 
Interdependance.” Journal of Strategic Studies, 31, no. 3 (June 2008): 425-466. 
 
Craig, Campbell, and Fredrik Logevall. America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity. 
Cambridge: Belknap Press of Havard University Press, 2009. 
 
Craig, Campbell. Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998. 
 
Eznack, Lucile. “Crisis as Signals of Strength: The Significance of Affect in Close Allies’ 
Relationship.” Security Studies, 20 (2011): 238-265. 
 
Hershberg, James G. “The Crisis Years, 1958-1963.” In Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, 
Interpretations, Theory, edited by Odd Arne Westad, 303-325. London: Frank Cass, 
2000. 
 
Hewlett, Richard G., and Jack M. Holl. Atoms for Peace and Wart 1953-1961: Eisenhower and 
the Atomic Energy Commission. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. 
 
Jones, Matthew. “Anglo-American Relations after Suez, the Rise and Decline of the Working 
Group Experiment, and the French Challenge to NATO, 1957-1959.” Diplomacy and 
Statecraft 14, no. 1 (March 2003): 49-79. 
 
 
31 
 
Kingseed, Cole C. Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University, 1995. 
 
Nichols, David A. Eisenhower 1956: The President’s Year of Crisis, Suez and the Brink of War. 
New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011. 
 
 
